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1 Introduction
The extent to which developing countries should enforce intellectual property
rights is a hotly debated topic. It is often heard that not doing so would allow a
cheap access to important products such as drugs. Some authors also point out
that in the nineteenth century, the US itself did not recognize foreign patents.
While the argument that a given small country can be made better-off by
free-riding on intellectual property in the rest of the world is straightforward,
empirically things are not so clear-cut: While Gould and Gruben (1996) find that
lower enforcement of Intellectual property reduces growth in a cross-section of
countries, a number of authors find adverse effects on foreign direct investment,
exports and licensing by US high-tech firms (See Lee and Mansfield (1996),
Smarczynska (2002), Smith, P. (1999), and Yang, G. and K. Maskus (1998)).
This paper develops a model for analyzing the costs and benefits of IP en-
forcement in LDCs. It is an endogenous growth model in the fashion of Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), with two countries, North and South. Innovation
only takes place in the North. The North is more productive than the South.
There are two types of goods, and each bloc has a comparative advantage in
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producing a specific type of good. If the South does not enforce IP (piracy),
then it is able to manufacture goods invented in the North without paying roy-
alties. These goods are sold at marginal cost instead of monopoly price, which
benefits world consumers from a static viewpoint. If comparative advantage
is strong enough, even under piracy there are goods that the South will not
produce. Piracy will then lead to a reallocation of innovative activity in favor
of these goods. That may harm consumers (including consumers in the South)
to the extent that these goods have smaller dynamic learning externalities than
the other goods, and that their share in consumption is small. Thus, whether
or not piracy is in the interest of the South depends on how important are the
goods for which it has a comparative advantage to its consumers, and what the
growth potential of these goods is. While, all else equal, the North tends to lose
more (or gain less) from piracy than the South, because monopoly profits even-
tually accrue to the North, the South may lose more than the North if there is
a strong enough home bias in favor of the goods for which it has a comparative
advantage.
Our results are reminiscent of two related papers: Diwan and Rodrik (1991)
consider the benefits of IPR in the South when there exists a range of products
that it specifically consumes. Greater specificity of these products make it more
costly for the South to opt for piracy, as it will get less innovation for the
products that it needs. Their paper, however, is static and does not consider
endogenous growth or comparative advantage. Thoenig and Verdier (2003)
argue that the threat of piracy will induce the North to invest in more complex,
skill-intensive technologies that are harder to imitate; the argument rests on a
direct link between complexity and imitation, while the effects discussed here
are relative price effects.1
1Other related works include Goh and Olivier (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2001).
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2 The model
There are two countries, denoted by A and B, and two types of goods, denoted
by 1 and 2. Within each type there potentially is a continuum of goods. Each
good is produced with a linear technology which uses labor only. At each date
t there is a continuum of goods, with a mass Ni of goods of type i. Goods of
either type are indexed by k ∈ [0, Ni]. Goods of type 1 differ from goods of type
2 in that the relative productivity of country B is not the same. Specifically,
country A produces all goods with a unit productivity. Country B produces
goods of type 1 with productivity b and goods of type 2 with productivity a.
We assume that country B is less developed than country A, and that it has a
comparative advantage in producing 1-goods. That is,
a < b < 1
Each country has a representative consumer. Utility is allowed to differ
between the two countries, embodying the possibility of home bias:
UA = α lnCA1 + (1− α) lnCA2 − (α lnα+ (1− α) ln(1− α));
UB = β lnCB1 + (1− β) lnCB2 − (β lnβ + (1− β) ln(1− β)).
where Cji , i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {A,B}, is the aggregate consumption index of goods
of type i in country j, given by
Cji =
ÃZ Nit
0
cijt(k)
σ−1
σ dk
! σ
σ−1
,
where cijt(k) is consumer j0s consumption of the i-good indexed by k at date t.
The demand function for good k of type i coming from country j is
cijt(k) = sij
Yjt
p¯it
µ
pit(k)
p¯it
¶−σ
,
where Yjt is aggregate nominal income in country j at t; pit(k) is the price of the
good considered; sij the appropriate income share (s1A = α; s2A = 1−α; s1B =
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β; s2B = 1− β); and p¯it the appropriate price index for i−goods:
p¯it =
ÃZ Nit
0
pit(k)
1−σdk
! 1
1−σ
.
Country j is endowed with Lj units of production labor. Furthermore, coun-
try A is endowed with a stock LR of researchers, who produce new blueprints
of either type. Thus, R & D can only take place in country A. The cost of pro-
ducing a new good is the same irrespective of the type of the good. Once the
good is invented, the inventor holds a monopoly right forever on the good. Re-
searchers decide ex-ante whether to try and invent a 1-good or a 2-good. Thus,
they all specialize in the good that yields the largest present discounted value,
unless the two PDVs are equal, in which case they are indifferent. To guarantee
sustained long-run growth, the cost of inventing new blueprints is assumed (in a
standard way) to be proportional to the total number of goods of the same type
Nit. Thus, if θt is the proportion of researchers working on 1-goods, we have
N˙1t = γ1θtN1t; (1)
N˙2t = γ2(1− θt)N2t.
Note that the γs are allowed to differ between the two types of goods: one
type of good may have stronger dynamic learning externalities than the other.
We will characterize equilibrium in two different cases:
1. Country B does not enforce any intellectual property by country A, and
can export the products it copies to country A. In such a case any good i can be
produced by the patent holder in country A plus a fringe of perfect competitors
in country B.
2. Country B fully enforces intellectual property rights. In such a case only
the patent holder can produce a good. Patent holders can be located in either
country2, but all monopoly profits accrue to country A.
2Or, equivalently, extract all the rents by licensing to a monopoly based in country B.
4
We now describe the main properties of the solution under different regimes,
relegating proofs to the Appendix. We first characterize the allocation of re-
sources and prices at a given date, and then study the determinants of innovation
and the evolution of the number of goods. We shall express prices in terms of
labor in country A. Its wage wA is therefore normalized to wA = 1.
3 Full piracy
Let us first analyze equilibrium in the case of full piracy. One can show that
there are 4 possible cases:
1. If
a <
αLA
(1− β)LB
<
b
µ
, (2)
then in equilibrium (Regime P1):
(i) Country A only produces 2-goods.
(ii) Country B only produces 1-goods
(iii) Prices are given by
wA = 1;
wB =
αµLA
(1− β)LB
< b;
p1 = wB/b;
p2 = µ.
(iv) Profits in country A are strictly positive for producers of 2-goods, and
would be strictly negative for producers of 1-goods. As a result, researchers in
country A only produce 2-goods.
(v) National income in country A is equal to
YA = µLA,
while in country B it is equal to
YB =
αµLA
(1− β) .
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Note that under piracy, GDP is equal to GNP as profit repatriation is the
only source of foreign income in the model.
2. If
a <
b
µ
<
αLA
(1− β)LB
,
then in equilibrium (Regime P2)
(i) Country A produces both types of goods.
(ii) Country B produces only 1-goods
(iii) Prices are given by
wA = 1;
wB = b;
p1 = 1;
p2 = µ.
(iv) Employment in 2-goods in country A is given by
L2A =
(1− α)LA + b(1− β)LB
αµ+ 1− α
(v) Profits are strictly positive for 2-goods and equal to zero for 1-goods.
Therefore, country 2’s researchers only invent 2-goods.
(vi) National incomes are given by
YA = (µ− 1)L2A + LA
and
YB = bLB
3. If
b
µ
< a <
αLA
(1− β)LB
,
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then in equilibrium (regime P3)
(i) Country A produces both types of goods.
(ii) Country B produces only 1-goods
(iii) Prices are given by
wA = 1;
wB = b;
p1 = 1;
p2 = b/a.
(iv) Employment in 2-goods in country A is given by
L2A =
(1− α)LA + b(1− β)LB
αb/a+ 1− α
(v) Profits are strictly positive for 2-goods and equal to zero for 1-goods.
Therefore, country 2’s researchers only invent 2-goods.
(vi) National incomes are given by
YA = (b/a− 1)L2A + LA
and
YB = bLB.
In terms of specialization, this regime is the same as regime P2. In terms
of pricing, however, it implies that producers of 2-goods in country A charge a
limit price equal to the cost of these goods in country B, rather than a monopoly
price.
4. If
αLA
(1− β)LB
< a,
then in equilibrium (Regime P4)
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(i) Country A only produces 2-goods
(ii) Country B produces both types of goods
(iii) Prices are given by
wA = 1;
wB = a;
p1 = a/b;
p2 = 1.
(iv) Employment in 1-goods in country B is given by
L1B =
αLA + aβLB
a
(v) Profits in country A would be negative for 1-goods, and are zero for
2-goods. Consequently, no innovation takes place and the wage of researchers
falls to zero.
(vi) We have
YA = LA
and
YB = aLB.
Note that regimes 2 and 3 entail the same pattern of specialization, but that
regime 3 has limit pricing instead of monopoly pricing. The phase diagram
corresponding to the four regimes is depicted in Figure 1. The conditions tell us
that if productivity in country B for 2-goods is small compared to the relative
size of the workforce in country A, then country B will only produce 1-goods
for which it has a comparative advantage. Depending on its size, country A
will either produce 2-goods or both types of goods. In both cases, only 2-goods
are making positive profits (in the first case a 1-good would make a negative
profit, in the second case a 1-good would make a zero profit). Furthermore,
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if a < b/µ, 2-goods producers in country A can charge monopoly prices. If
a > b/µ, 2-goods producers are compelled to charge a limit price b/a pinned
down by competition from country B. If productivity in country B for 2-goods
is large compared to the relative size of country A, then country B produces
both types of goods and country A only produces 2-goods. Its producers can’t
make any profits, otherwise they could lower their price by ε and increase their
profits by getting the whole markets, so it must be that p2 = 1.
4 Full enforcement
We now turn to the second case, where intellectual property is fully enforced
worldwide. There are three possible cases.
1. If
a <
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
< b, (3)
then (regime E1), all 1-goods are produced in country B, and all 2-goods are
produced in country A. Prices are given by
wA = 1,
p2 = µ,
wB =
αµLA
(1− β)LB + (1− α)(µ− 1)LB
,
and
p1 = µwB/b.
Profits for a 2-good produced in country A are given by
π2 = (µ− 1)
LA
N2
; (4)
profits for a 1-good produced in country B are given by
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π1 = (µ− 1)
LB
N1
wB
= (µ− 1)LB
N1
αµLA
(1− β)LB + (1− α)(µ− 1)LB
(5)
National incomes are given by
YA = µLA + (µ− 1)LBwB ;
YB = wBLB.
If we compare to case P1 above, it is clear that enforcement redistributes
income from country B to country A, in the form of monopoly profits for patent
holders in country A.
2. If
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
< a,
then (regime E4) country B produces both 1-goods and 2-goods, and country
A only produces 2-goods. Prices are given by
wA = 1,
wB = a,
p2 = µ,
p1 = µa/b.
Employment of workers in 2-goods in country B is given by
L2B =
(1− β)aLB + (1− α)(µ− 1)aLB − αµLA
µa
.
Profits for producers of 1-goods are equal to
π1 = (µ− 1)a
LB − L2B
N1
;
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and for producers of 2-goods they are equal to
π2 = (µ− 1)
LA + aL2B
N2
.
National incomes are given by
YA = µLA + (µ− 1)aLB;
YB = aLB .
3. If
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
> b,
then (regime E2) country A produces both types of goods, and country B pro-
duces 1-goods. Prices are given by
wA = 1,
wB = b,
p1 = p2 = µ.
Employment in 2-goods in country A is given by
L2A =
αµLA
(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1) .
Profits are now given by
π1 = (µ− 1)
bLB + LA − L2A
N1
π2 = (µ− 1)
L2A
N2
.
Incomes are
YA = µLA + (µ− 1)bLB ;
YB = bLB
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Figure 2 depicts which regime prevails as a function of LA/LB and µ. The
zones are substantially different from the enforcement regime. Note that profits
can be written πi = qi/Ni, where qi is a constant which only depends on the
regime being considered.
5 Innovation
We now analyze the determinants of innovation.
The R and D sector is competitive. All agents can borrow and lend at a fixed
nominal rate r. If Vi denotes the value of a patent associated with an i−good,
then
rVi = πi + V˙i (6)
In equilibrium, researchers allocate themselves between the two types of
innovation. The labor market for researchers is perfectly competitive, so that
they earn the same wage in each sector.
Let us first consider the full enforcement case. If θ is interior, and we confine
the analysis to this case, the expected value from one unit of research must be
the same in both sectors, implying
γ1N1V1 = γ2N2V2. (7)
Substituting (1) into (6), integrating forward and using (7), we get the equi-
librium value of θ :
θ =
(rγ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − rγ2q2
γ1γ2(q1 + q2)
.
Note that θ.does not depend on N1 and N2, and is constant through time. It
is increasing in the productivity of research for 1-goods γ1 and the profitability
of these goods q1, and decreasing in γ2 and q2. Finally for θ to be interior, we
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need that
rγ1q1
rγ2 + γ1γ2
≤ q2 ≤
(rγ1 + γ1γ2)q1
rγ2
(8)
We can then compute the growth rate of the mass of goods for each variety
N˙1
N1
=
(rγ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − rγ2q2
γ2(q1 + q2)
= g1
N˙2
N2
=
(rγ2 + γ1γ2)q2 − rγ1q1
γ1(q1 + q2)
= g2
In the no enforcement case, π1 ≤ 0 always. If π2 > 0, then θ = 0 and
g2 = γ2, while g1 = 0. If π2 = 0, then researchers are ‘unemployed’ and
g1 = g2 = π1 = π2 = 0.
6 Welfare
The regimes characterized above are valid at a point in time, but note that
the conditions do not depend on the values of N1 and N2 (That is because
preferences are Cobb-Douglas between the two aggregates). Therefore, if an
economy is in a given regime at t = 0, it will stay in that regime. If from time
t = 0 on, N1 and N2 grow at constant rates g1 and g2, it is then easy to express
the welfare of both countries as a function of their nominal national income, the
price levels, the initial number of goods and their growth rates. We get
UAt =
α
σ − 1 lnN1t +
1− α
σ − 1 lnN2t + lnYA − α ln p1 − (1− α) ln p2,
where time indices have been dropped from pi and YA, because they are constant
throughout if one remains in the same regime. Similarly,
UBt =
β
σ − 1 lnN1t +
1− β
σ − 1 lnN2t + lnYB − β ln p1 − (1− β) ln p2.
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The present discounted values, defined after having dropped the constant
terms, are given by
VA =
Z +∞
0
UAte
−ρtdt
=
α
σ − 1
µ
lnN10
ρ
+
g1
ρ2
¶
+
1− α
σ − 1
µ
lnN20
ρ
+
g2
ρ2
¶
+
lnYA − α ln p1 − (1− α) ln p2
ρ
.
VB =
β
σ − 1
µ
lnN10
ρ
+
g1
ρ2
¶
+
1− β
σ − 1
µ
lnN20
ρ
+
g2
ρ2
¶
+
lnYA − β ln p1 − (1− β) ln p2
ρ
.
To facilitate comparison, I will assume that the world economy is initially in
a balanced growth path with enforcement, and compare each country’s welfare
if enforcement continues with its value if country B stops enforcing IPRs. If
so, then under both alternatives Ni grows at a constant rate and the above
formulas may be applied. We assume full specialization of each country in the
enforcement case, i.e. that (3) holds; and that α(LA−LR)(1−β)LB <
b
µ , which, given (3),
implies that (2) also holds. Therefore, we focus the discussion on the case where
the economy is in regime P1 (resp. E1) under piracy (resp. enforcement). We
thus have from (5) and (4):
q1 = (µ− 1)
αµLALB
(1− β)LB + (1− α)(µ− 1)LB
, and
q2 = (µ− 1)LA.
The following Table then summarizes the shifts in the variables of interest if the
economy moves from an enforcement steady state to a no enforcement situation.
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∆ lnwB ln(1 +
(1−α)(µ−1)
1−β )
∆ lnwA 0
∆ ln p2 0
∆ ln p1 − lnµ+ ln(1 + (1−α)(µ−1)1−β )
∆g1 − (rγ1+γ1γ2)q1−rγ2q2γ2(q1+q2) < 0
∆g2
(rγ1+γ1γ2)q1−rγ2q2
γ1(q1+q2)
> 0
∆ lnYB ln(1 +
(1−α)(µ−1)
1−β )
∆ lnYA ln(1− α µ−1µ−β )
Table 1 — Changes in relevant variables when piracy is introduced.
When prices are expressed in units of labor in country A, we see that GNP
falls in country A while it goes up in country B. Country A’s patent holders
loses profit income from country B3, while at the same time the elimination of
markups from country B’s products drives its wage up.
The relative price of 1-goods may either go up or down: while the elimination
of the markup pushes it down, the higher wage in country 1 pushes it up. If
α = β, then p1 is unchanged. If α > β, p1 falls. That is because the fall in
the demand for 1-goods from consumers of country A (whose GNP falls) has
a stronger effect than the rise in demand from consumers of country B (whose
GNP goes up).
Intratemporal utility of consumers in country B goes up, given that the
change in p1 never exceeds the change in wB. As for consumers in country A,
their intratemporal utility may either go up or down, depending on whether or
not the fall in p1 is strong enough to outweigh the foregone profits from 1-goods.
What about intertemporal welfare? Using Table, 1 and noting that µ =
σ/(σ − 1), we get that
∆VA =
µ− 1
ρ2
(rγ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − rγ2q2
γ1γ2(q1 + q2)
(γ2 − α (γ1 + γ2))
+
1
ρ
∙
ln(1− αµ− 1
µ− β )− α ln(1 +
(1− α)(µ− 1)
1− β ) + α lnµ
¸
.
3These are the direct redistributive effects discussed, for example, by MacCalman (2000).
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∆VB =
µ− 1
ρ2
(rγ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − rγ2q2
γ1γ2(q1 + q2)
(γ2 − β (γ1 + γ2))
+
1
ρ
∙
(1− β) ln(1 + (1− α)(µ− 1)
1− β ) + β lnµ.
¸
To proceed, note that intertemporal optimization by consumers implies that
r = ρ.4
We can rewrite the preceding equations as
∆VA =
µ− 1
ρ2
(ργ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − ργ2q2
γ1γ2(q1 + q2)
(γ2 − α (γ1 + γ2)) (9)
+
1
ρ
∙
ln(1− αµ− 1
µ− β )− α ln(1 +
(1− α)(µ− 1)
1− β ) + α lnµ
¸
.
∆VB =
µ− 1
ρ2
(ργ1 + γ1γ2)q1 − ργ2q2
γ1γ2(q1 + q2)
(γ2 − β (γ1 + γ2)) (10)
+
1
ρ
∙
(1− β) ln(1 + (1− α)(µ− 1)
1− β ) + β lnµ.
¸
The first term of (9) and (10) represents the contribution to welfare of the
dynamic effects of piracy on the evolution of Ni : innovation now only takes
place in 2-goods. Given condition (8), this contribution is negative if and only
if
γ2
γ1 + γ2
< α. (11)
Hence, the dynamic effects of piracy are more likely to be negative, (i) the
greater the shares of 1-goods in consumption α and β, and (ii) the greater the
level of the dynamic externality in 1-goods, γ1, relative to 2-goods, γ2. The
intuition is straightforward: The welfare loss from piracy is greater if 1-goods
have a greater potential to grow, and if they are more important to consumers.
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Note also that this dynamic component is proportional to µ− 1. This captures
the fact that new goods are more valued, the less substitutes they are to existing
goods, in which case the equilibrium markup is also higher. Therefore, all gains
and losses from piracy are commensurate with µ− 1 : the markup gives us the
order of magnitude of both the level of monopoly distortions and the hedonic
value of greater product diversity. While it is possible to disentangle the two
effects by adding some power of N to the utility function (Bénassy, 1996), the
view that the elasticity of demand is lower when new goods are more valuable
is intuitively appealing.
For country B, a similar condition holds for dynamic gains to be negative:
γ2
γ1 + γ2
< β. (12)
The second terms of (9) and (10) are the static gains from piracy. For coun-
try B, they are always positive, since they result entirely from lower markups.
Consequently, if (12) is violated, country B unambiguously gains from piracy.
What if (12) holds. Static gains are positive, while dynamic gains are nega-
tive. One can check that the RHS of (??) is positive and then negative as ρ
falls. Thus there exists a critical level of the rate of time preference below which
piracy harms country B, and above which if benefits country B.
Turning now to country A, it is more difficult to compute the sign of the static
gains. One can however note that for β ≥ α (”home bias”), 1+ (1−α)(µ−1)1−β ≥ µ,
so that country A unambiguously loses from piracy. In such a case, it will always
oppose piracy if (11) holds. If (11) does not hold, country A will oppose piracy
if the discount rate is high but support it if the discount rate is low, as piracy
then reshuffles research into the goods with more favorable learning externalities
given its preferences. If β < α, the third term in the static gains for country
A dominates the second, implying that it would gain from piracy if µ is very
large. However, for µ close enough to one, the static gains are again negative,
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since a first-order Taylor approximmation yields α−β1−β −
1
1−β < 0.
To summarize, the preceding discussion suggests that the long-run gains
from IP enforcement to each country depend on how the expenditure share of 1-
goods compare to the relative growth potential of 2-goods. For an equal growth
potential, long-run gains from IP enforcement are positive if the expenditure
share on 1-good exceeds 50 % (or, more generally, the expenditure share on
2-goods).
If α = β, then country A is always less likely to gain/more likely to lose from
piracy. However, the assumption β > α, i.e. that goods in which a country has
a comparative advantage are also goods that its consumers like better relative
to other consumers in the rest of the world (”home bias”), is also intuitive. Such
a property could arise if economies were once closed and if productivity levels
were determined by learning by doing, or tastes by habit formation.
If 1-goods are more important to consumers in country B than to consumers
in country A, and if at the same time it has a comparative advantage in pro-
ducing these goods, then it may actually lose more from piracy than country
A: While static gains are negative for country A and positive for country B,
condition (12) is more likely to hold than (11), so that country B is more likely
to suffer dynamic losses from piracy; that is because it cares more about the
goods for which innovation has fallen.
.
Finally, one can just check that computing dynamic gains amount to com-
puting the change in growth rates for the aggregate consumption index. The
growth rate of the aggregate consumption index is
gA =
αg1 + (1− α)g2
σ − 1 ,
in country A and
gB =
βg1 + (1− β)g2
σ − 1 ,
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in country B. Using the above formulae, we see that piracy reduces growth
in country A if and only if
α >
γ2
γ1 + γ2
,
which is a sufficient condition for country A to always lose in welfare terms.
Similarly, country B’s growth is reduced iff:
β >
γ2
γ1 + γ2
,
which is a necessary condition for welfare to fall in country B. Finally note
that if β > α, country B grows less fast than country A in the piracy regime.
However, that is in terms of the relevant basket of goods consumed by its resi-
dents. Both countries would grow at the same rate in PPP terms.
6.1 The role of the markup
While the preceding approximation is fairly tractable, it cannot be used to
study the role of the markup µ. As already explained, this parameter plays a
twin role, as it goes up, so does the static loss from monopoly pricing. But,
at the same time, complementarity between goods goes up, and people value
innovation more.
I report the results of numerical simulations where country B may lose from
IP enforcement. In the first simulation, (figures 3-5), the parameters are LA =
LB = 1, α = β = 0.3, a = 0.2, b = 0.9, γ1 = 0.02, γ2 = 0.006, ρ = 0.03.
Here dynamic losses come from the fact that 2-goods involve smaller learning
externalities (γ2 < γ1).
5 Figure 3 plots the evolution of the static and dynamic
gains for country A. Both are negative: country A loses both from slower growth
and foregone profits. Furthermore, losses go up with the markup. As for
5One may check that for these parameters, the economy is in regimes P1 and E1 for the
values of µ that are used.
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country B (Fig. 4), it has static gains from the elimination of monopoly pricing,
and dynamic losses from lower innovation in 1-goods. Both gains and losses are
increasing with the markup. Whether the country gains or loses on net depends
on the discount factor. Figure 5 plots the value of ρ below which piracy does
not pay for country B. A striking property is that it is increasing with the
markup; that suggests that as goods become more complementary, the value of
having more 1-goods becomes stronger relative to the greater static losses from
monopoly pricing. Equivalently, given ρ, a greater markup makes it more likely
that piracy is not in the interest of country B. Note however that with these
parameter values the critical ρ is very small.
In the second simulation, (figures 6-9), parameters are LA = LB = 1, α =
0.2, β = 0.6, a = 0.2, b = 0.9, γ1 = γ2 = 0.02, ρ = 0.01.
6 Dynamic losses to
country B now come from the fact that it puts a high weight on 1-goods, contrary
to country A. As Figure 6 shows, country A has static losses from piracy, but
positive dynamic gains as innovation is reallocated to the goods on which it
spends a high share. Thus it will prefer piracy if patient enough. Figure 7 plots
the critical discount rate of country A beyond which it prefers piracy. It is again
increasing with the markup, meaning that the higher the monopoly rent, the
more likely it is that the innovative country A prefers piracy! This paradoxical
result comes from the fact that the structure of innovation is inefficient from
country A’s perspective, because too much effort is devoted to producing the
1-goods that its consumers value little. Given that country B is not productive
enough to compete with country A in the production of 2-goods, letting it
engage in piracy triggers a reallocation of research in favor of 2-goods which is
quite welcome by consumers in country A, provided they are patient enough to
be willing to trade foregone royalties agains future increments in the number
of varieties it likes. Greater complementarities between goods increases the
foregone monopoly rents as well as the utility gain from having more 2-goods in
6The value of ρ was lowered so as to prevent θ from being negative.
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the future, and the simulations tells us that the latter effect dominates. Turning
now to country B, net gains are reported on Figure 8. The pattern is similar to
the preceding simulation. Again, greater monopoly power makes it more likely
that country B loses from piracy, as the critical discount rate is again increasing
with µ. Here again, the critical discount rates are quite low: static effects seem
to dominate for plausible values of the discount rate.
7 Summary and conclusion
The model yields a number of insights with respect to the costs and benefits
of piracy in an international trade context. First, piracy triggers a reallocation
of R and D in favor of the goods (2-goods) in which the richer country has a
comparative advantage. Second, this reallocation tends to reduce welfare if (i)
dynamic learning externalities are high in 1-goods relative to 2-goods, and if
(ii) the share of 1-goods in consumption is high. Third, if consumers across the
world spend the same fraction of their income on each type of goods, the richer
country is more likely to incur a net loss than the poorer, because of the foregone
royalties associated with its intellectual property. However, if there is a ”home
bias” in that consumers spend more on the goods in which their country has
a comparative advantage than foreign consumers, then the poorer country may
lose, and it will grow less fast, in utility terms, under the piracy regime than
the richer country. Finally, a higher monopoly power does not increase the net
social gains from piracy, because it is associated with greater complementarities
between goods which also makes innovation more valuable.
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8 Appendix
Let us first characterize an equilibrium where country B only produces 1-goods.
We will normalize the wage of workers in country A to wA = 1. Country B
can produce any good competitively. Therefore, its producers will pin down the
price of 1-goods:
p1(k) = wB/b = p1,∀k.
2-goods can be produced in country B at cost wB/a. Therefore,
p2(k) = p2 = min
³wB
a
, µwA
´
,
where µ = σ/(σ − 1) is the monopoly markup one would observe absent com-
petition from country B.
In equilibrium, it must be better to buy goods from competitive producers
in country B than from the patent holder in country A. Therefore, one must
have
wB/b < µwA = µ.
To compute equilibrium quantities, note that national income in country B
is
YB = wBLB
Country A potentially produces both types of goods. Let LiA be the labor
input in country A devoted to i-goods. Then:
YA = p2L2A +
wB
b
L1A
That equation is the GDP at market prices national income identity, saying
that GDP is the total value of final goods being sold.
Equilibrium of supply and demand for either type of good leads to the fol-
lowing equality, which must hold in equilibrium:
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αp2L2A = wB
∙
1− α
b
L1A + (1− β)LB
¸
(13)
Let us first look for an equilibrium with monopoly pricing for the 2-goods,
and no production of good 1 in country A. Then wB must be such that
µ < wB/a, (14)
and
wB/b < wA = 1. (15)
The first condition states that the monopoly price of 2-goods is lower than
their production cost in country B. The second condition says that the cost of
1-goods in country A is higher than in country B, so that no holder of a patent
for a 1-good in country A wants to actually produce.
We then have L1A = 0, L2A = LA. Consequently, eq. (13) implies
wB =
αµLA
(1− β)LB
.
Substituting into conditions (14) and (15), we find that this regime holds iff
a <
αLA
(1− β)LB
<
b
µ
,
which characterizes regime (P1). Note that this regime may only hold if b > aµ.
Let us now look for a regime where country A produces some 1-goods, as-
suming again monopoly pricing in the 2-goods. This will be the case if (14)
holds and if
wB ≥ b. (16)
Given that p1 = wB/b, if p1 > 1, then it is profitable for producers of 1-
goods in country A to cover the whole market, leaving no output for producers
in country B (the standard dominant firm result). That cannot be true in
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equilibrium, as it contradicts the full employment condition in country B and
the assumption that country B only produces 2-goods. Therefore in such a
regime it must be that wB = b. Profits are equal to zero for producers of
1-goods in country A. L2A is then determined by (13), yielding
L2A =
(1− α)LA + b(1− β)LB
αµ+ 1− α .
For this regime to hold, it must be that (14), holds, i.e. µ < b/a, and that
L2A ≤ LA, that is
b
µ
<
αLA
(1− β)LB
.
This therefore characterizes regime P2.
Now let us consider the possibility of limit pricing in 2-goods, and no pro-
duction of 1-goods in country A. That corresponds to the following conditions:
p2 =
wB
a
< µ
and
wB < b.
One then has L1A = 0, L2A = LA Plugging these conditions into (13), we
find that this is a knife-edge case which can only hold if αLA/a = (1 − β)LB.
We shall therefore ignore it.
Now consider the case of limit pricing in 2-goods, and some production of
1-goods in country A. We again have p2 = wBa < µ and wB = b. Substituting
into (13) we get
L2A =
(1− α)LA + b(1− β)LB
αb/a+ 1− α .
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This regime holds if b/a < µ and L2A < LA, or equivalently
a <
αLA
(1− β)LB
.
Thus we have characterized regime P3.
Now let us look at an equilibrium where country B produces both goods.
It must be that p1 = wB/b and p2 = wB/a.
For country B to produce some of the 2-goods, it must be that p2 ≤ wA = 1,
otherwise monopolists in country A would flood the market.
Assume p2 < 1, then a fortiori p1 < 1, as b > a. Then, no producer in country
A would be profitable, which contradicts the full employment condition there.
Thus we must have p2 = 1, implying wB = a. Then p1 = a/b < 1, implying that
country A does not produce 1-goods.
The equilibrium is then easily characterized. Profits in country A are equal
to zero, GDP in country A is
YA = wAL2A = LA;
and GDP in country B is given by
YB = wBLB = aLB.
Equilibrium in the goods markets can be written
α
YA
p1
+ β
YB
p1
= bL1B ,
implying
L1B =
αLA + βaLB
a
.
For this regime to hold we must have L1B < LB, i.e.
αLA
(1− β)LB
< a.
26
This therefore characterizes regime P4.
We now turn to the enforcement regime.
In this regime all production units are owned by the monopolist in country
2, regardless of where they are located. Prices are thus always equal to the
markup times the wage in the country where the good is being produced.
First consider the case where country A only produces 2-goods and country
B only produces 1-goods. We then have
p1 = µwB/b; (17)
p2 = µwA = µ. (18)
GNP for country A’s residents is
YA = p2LA + (µ− 1)wBLB , (19)
where the second term represents profits repatriated from country B.
GNP in country B is given by
YB = wBLB. (20)
Equilibrium in goods markets is given by
(1− α)YA
p2
+ (1− β)YB
p2
= LA. (21)
Substituting (17)-(20) we get
wB =
αµLA
(1− β)LB + (1− α)(µ− 1)LB
.
For this regime to be an equilibrium, it must be that firms do not want to
relocate in the other country. Consider first a monopoly based in country A. Its
profit is given by
π2 = (µ− 1)c2,
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where c2 = LA/N2 is the amount sold of each 2-good.
If it decides to relocate in country B, its unit cost is wB/a. It will charge
p02 = µwB/a, and sell a quantity equal to c02 = c2(p02/p2)−σ, so that its profits
are
π02 = c2(µ− 1) (wB/a)
1−σ .
We must have π02 ≤ π2, i.e. wB/a > 1. Similarly, for producers of 1-goods
not to want to relocate in country A, we need wB/b < 1. These two inequalities
are equivalent to
a <
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
< b,
and this characterizes regime E1. It is then straightforward to compute
profits.
Now consider an equilibrium where country B produces 1-goods and 2-goods,
and country A produces only 2-goods. Producers of 2-goods must be indifferent
between locating in country A and locating in country B, therefore we must
have wB/a = wA = 1. Hence
wB = a.
Consequently, p2 = µ and p1 = µa/b.
Equations (19) and (20) still hold, while (21) must be replaced by
(1− α)YA
p2
+ (1− β)YB
p2
= LA + aL2B.
Substituting, this allows to compute L2B :
L2B =
(1− β)aLB + (1− α)(µ− 1)aLB − αµLA
µa
.
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For this regime to be an equilibrium, one must have 0 < L2B < LB, which,
as the second inequality L2B < LB is always satisfied, is equivalent to
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
< a.
This characterizes regime E4.
Finally, consider a regime where country A produces 1-goods and 2-goods,
and country B only produces 1-goods. Equality of unit costs across countries
for 1-goods implies
wB = b.
Hence, p1 = p2 = µ; and equilibrium in goods markets can be obtained by
substituting L2A for LA into the RHS of (21), yielding
L2A = (1− α)LA +
bLB
µ
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)] .
This regime holds if L2A < LA, or equivalently
αµLA
[(1− β) + (1− α)(µ− 1)]LB
> b.
This therefore characterizes regime E2.
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Figure 5: Critical discount rate, country B
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Figure 6: Country A's gains from piracy
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Figure 7: Critical discount rate, country A
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Figure 8: Net gains, country B
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Figure 9: Critical discount rate, country B
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